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Abstract 
Lauded for its success and heralded as an economic model for peripheral European countries 
to follow, since the bursting of the Irish property bubble in 2008 the management of the Celtic 
Tiger by the Irish state has been castigated as expressively how not to manage an economic 
bubble. Following a decade and a half of continuous growth averaging over six per cent, the 
Irish economy has since experienced significant depression which is currently stagnating with 
seemingly little prospect of abating. Since 2008, much talk within the Irish media has centred 
on whether the state might have managed the Celtic Tiger better and thus averted much of the 
destruction wrought by the bursting of the Irish property bubble. 
 
Thus the purpose of this thesis was to ascertain whether the Irish state might have learned 
valuable lessons to avert such a property bubble from a previous case of property bubble, 
namely that of Japan in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This thesis compares the two cases, 
establishing their similarities – and thus grounds for comparison – with particular focus on the 
role played by both states. It then makes a number of suggestions as to what lessons the Irish 
state might have taken from the Japanese case so as to reduce the over-inflation of the Celtic 
Tiger’s property bubble, and thus averting much of the fallout caused by its 2008 bursting. It 
then concludes by that stating that while previous Ireland’s economic growth was regarded 
with something as approaching awe, in the future it might instead be studied as an example of 
how not to manage an economic boom. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Words: Japan, Celtic Tiger, role of the state within the economy, economic bubble, 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.1 Overview and Perspectives 
Since 2008 the most pressing theme in Ireland has been that of the dramatic bursting of  a 
vastly inflated property bubble; a bursting which not only ended the previous fifteen years of 
strong economic growth and rising living standards but one which sent the country into 
recession and instigated a state of extreme economic stagnation. Following the end of the 
Celtic Tiger, much energy has been expended by the Irish media on allegations of 
mismanagement and blatent ignoring of warnings on the part of the government and relevant 
property market actors concerning the property market in Ireland.  Such actions, or indeed 
non-actions subsequently saw the property bubble overly-inflate and many analysts sought to 
establish what measures could have been taken to avoid such a dramatic crash.  
 
Through a mixture of attention to print and broadcast media and the modules I have 
undertaken in this Master’s program, I have noticed the wide range of similarities that can be 
drawn betweenthe Irish Celtic Tiger case and that of Japan in a period stretching from the late 
1980s to the early 1990s. Given that both countries enjoyed sustained periods of envied 
economic growth,1 highly valued property markets and harsh bursting of bubbles, I argue that 
there is a strong case for a comparison to be made between the property markets of these two 
countries. An important point to note is that  a major difference between the two cases is that  
the Irish property market appears to be still in freefall whereas the Japanese example can be 
viewed in retrospect; thus one can speculate as to whether the Japanese experiences during 
that country’s property crash might providevaluable  lessons for the the relevant Irish 
authorities. Thus the overarching research aim of this thesis is to identify commonalities 
between both countries’ property markets and their associated property market crashes.  
Following on from this, I will seek to establish whether the Irish state could have applied 
lessons from the Japanese experiences and thus circumnavigated the the calamitous property 
crash which occurred in September 2008. 
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1.2 Research Problem and Question 
As mentioned above, the research aim of this thesis is to ascertain whether the Japanese 
economic bubble of the late 1980s and early 1990s might have provided lessons to the Irish 
state during the Irish Celtic Tiger; lessons which if acted on may have allowed Ireland 
minimise or even avoid some of the disastrous consequences following the Tiger’s collapse in 
mid-2008. Thus my research question is as follows: might the Japanese economic bubble of 
1985 to 1993 have provided lessons to the Irish state which would have mitigated the 
ramifications following the collapse of the Celtic Tiger of 1995 to 2008?  
 
1.3 Theoretical Approach 
The theoretical approach taken in this dissertation is that of neoclassical economics, chosen 
becuase it resonates so smoothly with the overarching research aim of the study proper. I will 
discuss my theoretical approach more fully in the following chapter but a brief snapshot of 
why I feel neoclassical economics fits my dissertation seems apposite at this juncture. A key 
feature of this discipline is its focus upon both the economic decisions of individuals and how 
these translate onto a broader scale of the wider economy.  Given that my research question 
concerns the policy decisions of the Irish state (historic, current and future), I feel that this is a 
relevant topic. Neoclassical economics can also be of relevance to topics within the realm of 
political economy.  As my intended results will be more subjective and analytical as opposed 
to mathematical deductions, I therefore feel this is another advantage for choosing the 
neoclassicaleconomics discipline as my theoretical approach. This standpoint will be 
expanded on in Chapter Two.   
 
1.4 Research Gap Thesis Will Address 
Naturally it is difficult to speculate what results or derivations a study will produce.  
Notwithstanding this however, I believe that the completion of this study will result in a 
number of timely conclusions. As stated earlier in this section, following the collapse of the 
Irish housing bubble in the middle of 2008, a significant amount of media coverage centred 
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on the similarities between the Irish example and that of Japan fifteen years previously.2 
However despite this attention, such comparisons were often very vague, even bordering on 
the anecdotal on occasion. Due to this I believe that there exists a substantial gap within the 
research literature to warrant further exploration of this subject, a gap this judicious research 
study seeks to fill. 
 
The gap in the research, in my view, is that although there has been comparisons made 
between Ireland and Japan they have been broad brushstroke comparison, at times even 
tenuous.  Thus I argue that there is  a need for a more expansive study focusing on the 
similarities between the two countries’ bubbles and overall patterns of decline. Additionally, 
the aim is that by the closing of this thesis it will have been established whether there might 
have been lessons from the Japanese case that the relevant Irish authorities could, indeed 
should have learnt. More specifically, I hope to ascertain to what extent the overall patterns of 
the two property bubbles overlap, if not match each other.  Could  the Irish state  have looked 
at the Japanese example,deduced that a similar scenario was occurring in the Irish Celtic Tiger 
and responded accordingly?  
 
1.5 Content of Thesis 
The intended empirical content of my thesis is a review of the experiences of both Japan and 
Ireland in their respective property bubbles and subsequent economic crashes, before 
comparing and contrasting the two cases to establish ifJapanese experiences could have been 
transferable to the Irish case. Thus the overall structure and layout of this thesis is as follows: 
This introductory chapter sketches a brief background to the property milieu of each country 
within this thesis’ timeframe and importantly, presents the study’s main research questions.  
Following on from this, Chapter Two  discusses my theoretical approach, both explaining and 
justifying its suitability for this particular research study. Within this chapter I shall also 
provide an overview of economic bubbles, generally as well as more specifically property 
bubbles so as to provide more background and understanding to this topic. Following this 
theoretical chapter, I shall then discuss the methodology of this thesis in Chapter Three, 
explaining what approach was taken, justifying why such a choice was made and outlining it 
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was applied during the research of this study.  After this Chapters Four and Five respectively 
are devoted to the Japanese and Irish examples, in which I shall first recount the rise of both 
economies, contemporary fears surrounding whether the economies were ‘overcooking’, the 
bursting of both their property bubbles and a brief account of what transpired post-bubble in 
both countries. So as to fully facilitate a comparison between Japan and Ireland, each chapter 
will also contain a section containing comparative variables-both economic and also socio-
demographic-which will assist in comparing and contrasting both cases, as well as providing 
additional background to the property bubbles of each country.  
 
There is no distinct literature review chapter within my thesis, a conscious decision which I 
made due to a number of factors. In my initial first draft I did include a literature review.  
However, upon reviewing my initial literature review draft, the majority of its focus appeared 
to be on the theory of my thesis. Thus my following chapter on theory somewhat doubles as a 
literature review, a decision which I believe maximises the space afforded to me for this thesis 
without detracting from its content. 
 
Fiinally, the thesis concludes with an analysis of marked ‘rise and fall’ patterns in both 
countries, an assessment of the economic impact of burst property bubbles and the extent of 
the similarities between both examples, once again reminding the reader that an underlying 
motivation of this research was to establish if indeed the Japanese case might have provided 
crucial lessons to the Irish example. I shall close with a brief recount of the material covered 
within the thesis, before making my final conclusions. Methodological decisions made 
throughout this research, all the time infused with the theoretical approach of this study, will 
enable this thesis to succinctly answer its research questions.  
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Chapter Two: Theory 
 
2.1 Theoretical Approach of Neoclassical Economics 
The purpose of this  chapter is to present the theory employed within this dissertation, that of 
neoclassical economics, explaining both its choice and what form of theoretical framework it 
provides for the remainder of this thesis. After having both explained and discussed 
neoclassical economic theory including acknowledgement of the weakness of the stance in the 
eyes of some commentators, I will explain why I regard it to be so applicable to my thesis. 
 
Originally introduced by Thorstein Veblen in 1900, the term neoclassical economics 
delineates a distinct and relatively homogenous school of thought of economic theory which 
first became prominent in the late nineteenth century following the Marginal Revolution and 
now arguably dominates mainstream economics.34 The Marginal Revolution is the term given 
to describe developments during the middle of the nineteenth century which saw economists 
such as Jevons, Menger and Walras seek to introduce the idea of marginal utility into 
economic thought. Previously, the field had been dominated by classical economics which 
focused on ideas surrounding the production and distribution of wealth. However, the concept 
of marginal utility challenged such thinking by attempting to explain the discrepancy in the 
value of goods and services by reference to their secondary, or marginal, utility and providing 
an explanation as to why why certain products might be valued more highly by certain 
individuals and the possession of such offering greater marginal utility.5 It is within this field, 
with its attendant focus upon human preferences and behaviour where current neoclassicism 
resides. 
 
While well-recognised, the term neoclassical economics is nevertheless somewhat fraught 
with ambiguity as a clear unanimous definition can be difficult to ascertain.  Broadly speaking 
it is in agreement that economics is a science that views human behaviour as a relationship 
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between ends and [at times] scarce means that have alternative uses depending on the 
situation and context at hand. According to Brennan and Moehler, neoclassical economists are 
often regarded as pursuing this line of study by using supply and demand models that place a 
value on price depending upon the subjective preferences of producers and consumers.6 Such 
preferences on the part of consumers and producers are relied upon so as to avoid the so-
called objective theory of classical economics, in which the value of goods can be established 
by reference to either a basic commodity or the labour required to produce it.7 Recognition of 
humans possessing subjective preferences for certain products rejects this classical theory of 
being able to aportionproduct value according to certain fixed references.  Rather it subscribes 
to the earlier, briefly discussed, theory of marginal utility often being responsible for a 
products price.  
 
Neoclassical economic theory regarding such behaviour rests certain assumptions which 
according to E. Roy Weintraub are:8 
• People have rational preferences among outcomes that can be identified 
and associated with a value. 
• Individuals maximise utility whereas firms maximise profits. I.e. 
individuals make decisions regarding their desire for a particular 
product, whereas the decision of a firm is based solely upon its future 
profitability. 
• People act independently on the basis of full and relevant information 
 
From these three assumptions, neoclassical economists have built a structure to understand 
how people allocate scarce resources among alternative decisions - in fact understanding such 
allocation is often considered the definition of economics to neoclassical theorists. The 
identification of these three assumptions as underpinning neoclassical economics is taken 
even further by Arnsperger and Varoufakis, who describe them as: methodological 
individualism; methodological instrumentalism and methodological equilibrium.9 
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The first of these concerns the focus of neoclassical economics with the individual. 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis write that this can best be understood in relation to the roots of the 
discipline itself within liberal individualist social science.  Here the socio-economic 
phenomenon under scrutiny is  analysed by focusing upon the individual whose actions 
helped to bring it about.10 To such an individual the first tenet of this theory is the idea that 
socio-economic explanation must be sought at the level of the individual agents, 
independently of the social whole their actions bring about.  
 
The second assumption of neoclassical economics, methodological instrumentalism, relates to 
what motivates actors to make economic decisions, whether that is maximising utility for 
individuals or maximising profit for firms. This assumption holds that all behaviour is 
preference-driven, wherepreference is a constant and the only thing that changes is what each 
individual is motivated by or prefers. In this sense, neoclassical theory is a narrow version of 
consequentialism in which the only consequence that matters is the extent to which an actor’s 
index of ‘preference-satisfaction’ can be maximised.11 Such an assumption should be viewed 
as so given, that “there is no longer any philosophical room for questioning whether an agent 
will act on their preferences”.12  
 
The third and final basic tenet of neoclassical economics according to Arnsperger and 
Varoufakis is methodological equilibrium. This equilibrium is, in theory, what will occur once 
methodological individualism and instrumentalism are carried to their logical conclusions. If 
neoclassical economics is concerned with understanding the behaviour of individual actors 
and such behaviour will always follow certain instrumental lines, than it must follow that 
aggregate behaviour of individuals will become sufficiently regular so as to give rise to solid 
predictions.13  Thus neoclassical economists attempt to answer a central question:  ‘what 
behaviour should be expected in equilibrium?’  To answer this question, analysis must begin 
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by examining the agents’ utility functions, specifying their constraints, and stating their 
‘information’ or ‘belief’.14 By following its natural conclusion, such an approach points to 
actors making economic decisions based on the information available and which they view as 
relevant. The question of whether such equilibrium is attainable or how it might manifest 
itself is treated as somewhat irrelevant and “not central to the neoclassical project”.15 
 
It is difficult to envisage a scenario of a trained economist denying that their theoretical 
practices digress from the three methodological moves mentioned above: individualism; 
instrumentalism and; equilibrium. Arnsperger and Varoufakis thus conclude that despite 
periodic denials on the part of theorists who wish their discipline to be simply labelled as 
scientific economics, there is a growing body which subscribes to the three assumptions listed 
above.  This theory, argue Armsperger and Varoufakis, can be legitimately labelled as 
neoclassical economics16. Notwithstanding their contention and desspite its position as a 
leading branch of current economic theory, neoclassical economics is not without its critics. 
Key criticisms of the discipline include that it possesses a normative bias whereby it can often 
describe a ‘utopia of equilibrium’ rather than actual economics in the real world.17 
Additionally, neoclassical economics has been accused of ignoring key aspects of human 
behaviour, instead focusing rather upon an ‘economic man’.  According to Vebler, this is 
entirely rational and is “a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a 
homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift about the 
area, but leave him intact”.18 Both of these criticisms point to neoclassical economics as being 
somewhat ignorant of the real world, instead choosing to focus upon a more abstract utopia 
where all human beings are entirely rational. However, while conceding that such a 
contention may have a degree of validity, I feel that Arnsperger and Varoufakis rebuke this 
point very well, when they discuss the importance of equilibrium to neoclassical economics, 
arguing that whether such equilibrium is realistic or is not the crux of matter, but rather it is 
merely a place where theorists can imagine rules to be followed free from outside 
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interference, similar to the ‘controlled environment’ that natural scientists create for their 
experiments.  
 
After having both explained and discussed neoclassical economic theory including 
acknowledging the weakness of the stance by some commentators, I now feel it pertinent to 
explain why I regard it to be such a good fit for my thesis and why all three of its key 
assumptions - methodological individualism; methodological instrumentalism and 
methodological equilibrium are so applicable to my topic. Beyond the obvious that this thesis 
relates directly to political economy and therefore perhaps a pure economic theoretical 
paradigm would be more expedient?; nevertheless I feel  neoclassical economics resounds 
strongly with my overriding research aim. As I outlined in my introduction, my thesis is a 
study of the property bubbles of the past two decades in both Japan and Ireland, with my 
research aim being to ascertain whether the Irish state might learned valuable lessons from the 
earlier Japanese case. Therefore, the key aim surrounds the behaviour taken by certain 
individuals, and what information, or knowledge of past developments, might have persuaded 
them to take different action.  
 
The link between such an analysis of policy on the part of key individuals in both cases and 
the first two assumptions of individualism and instrumentalism I feel are readily apparent. 
These assumptions can be seen as motivation factors for certain policies or political directions 
taken by either state19, with the first assumption of individualism in particular being easily 
identifiable with the desire of both Japanese and Irish governments to prolong their periods of 
economic growth. Similarly, the third assumption of individuals acting upon the basis of 
having full and relevant information, can be seen as the topic of my research aim, establishing 
whether  the Irish state might have been able to take lessons from the Japanese case had it 
taken more note of said case, and if so what information would have been required to 
influence such a shift in behaviour?  
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2.2 Economic Bubbles 
Having provided a theoretical background to neoclassical economics, it now seems 
appropriate to provide some background to the concept of economic bubbles, Generally 
regarded as an economic cycle characterised by rapid expansion, often more than is warranted 
by the fundamentals, before a rapid contraction, economic bubbles have moved more into the 
public conscious following the global financial crisis of 2008.20 The term bubble itself, can be 
traced back the South Sea Bubble of 1711 to 1720 in Great Britain.2122  Upon studying such 
crises one can immediately understand the choice of the word ‘bubble’ for it acts as an apt 
metaphor for inflated stock prices which expand due to nothing more than speculation before 
sudden bursting once over-extended.23  
 
Despite this lack of common consensus which might adequately explain the phenomenon, I 
believe that a tentative list of common characteristics can be established: 
 
• Firstly, that the price of an asset exceeds its worth. Thus, that its selling price is 
significantly greater than the amount the owner can reasonably expect to accrue in 
resultant cash flow.24  However, the identification of when assets move beyond their 
worth is problematic as fundamental value can be difficult to ascertain. 
• The second characteristic is that both during the periods of expansion and contraction 
the asset in question is subject to high volume trading, trading in which expectation is 
placed on the direction of change-often contrary to normal market conditions.25  
• Thirdly the presence of excess liquidity in a financial system can often lead to bubbles, 
as put simply: 'too much money chases too few assets’.  This is especially pertinent in 
the cases of Japan and Ireland.26 
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Yet despite such academic interest in the subject, there remains no singular unanimous 
explanation for what causes bubbles to develop. Various theories have been offered such as 
excess monetary expansion, low interest rates and the well-known ‘Greater Fool Theory’; 
however none have proved sufficient with bubbles even occurring in highly predictable 
(experimental) markets which ought to prevent irrationality.27  This difficulty in establishing 
causes means that bubbles are frequently identified in retrospect, with much of the research 
surrounding them being focused on the impact their bursting can have.28 
 
Jarrow, Protter and Shimbo broadly identify three distinctive forms of bubbles, arguing that 
examples of bubbles tend to fit into one of these categories. The first type of bubble is a 
uniformly integrable martingale, existing with an infinite lifetime. This definition is further 
expanded by the authors who suggest that “Type 1 can be viewed as an asset price containing 
a component analogous to fiat money”.29  The second type of bubble is non-uniformly 
integrable martingales, existing for a finite-but unbounded-lifetime and is created by the 
caveat that trading strategies must finish in finite time.30  The third variety of bubble is a strict 
local martingale and similarly to the second category, exists for a finite lifetime.31   The 
authors provide a more in-depth explanation of this third type of bubble, suggesting it is 
created due to a standard admissibility condition. This condition, explained as the value of a 
short lowering to a certain value at which point the trading strategy must be terminated with 
positive profitability before the bubble bursts, removes downward selling pressure on the 
price of the asset and thereby allows the existence of such bubbles.32  
 
In addition to these three types of bubble, Komáromi states that econometric models which 
assume rational behaviour on the part of investors divide bubbles into two broad sets, rational 
and speculative.33  Speculative bubbles are defined as when market price and fundamental 
value of an asset diverge ‘too far apart’, therefore there realistically can be no resultant 
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income that will support the current market price. In contrast, rational bubbles also have 
market prices higher than fundamental values but such a price may be justified by the rational 
expectations of market players. Komáromi argues that such rational bubbles only form when 
shares lack a definite maturity.  In such a scenario, the fundamental value is used almost as an 
anchor, with the actual market price staying somewhat attached to it.34  Investors do recognise 
the disparity between market price and fundamental value; however still expect further 
increases in price. As there is never a guarantee for the eventual offset of prices, this bubble 
continues to swell until it reaches its point of maximum expansion and does so within a 
definite timeframe as argued by Jarrow, Protter and Shimbo.  It ultimately implodes, thereby 
allowing the process to begin again.  
 
Expanding on the topic of differing bubble types, Komáromi contends that a question of vital 
importance is whether economists can find a separating condition to explain these two types 
of bubbles, which is “the critical degree of divergence from fundamental value”. Naturally, 
there exist other definitions of the varying categories of bubbles, chief amongst these is the 
model propagated by Allen, Morris and Postlewaith. Rather than Komáromi’s rational and 
speculative bubbles, this model uses ‘expected’ and ‘strong’ as the two categories of bubbles.  
However, following my reading of this model, I regard it as sufficiently similar to 
Komáromi’s definitions with no substantive difference in terms of classification so as to mean 
that further analysis of the model would be somewhat moot.35 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
After having discussed the theory behind neoclassical economics and economic bubbles, I 
believe that I can now lay out the theoretical framework for my thesis. The problem that I set 
out to address is whether the Irish state could have acted differently in the managing of the 
Celtic Tiger and subsequent downturn, were lessons from previous economic bubbles – in this 
case Japan – observed. The main concepts within this problem I believe are the nature of 
economic bubbles, and the role played by Japanese and Irish governments in their respective 
bubbles. I believe I have sufficiently dealt with the former during this chapter, while the two 
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chapters following later in this thesis concerning Ireland and Japan  deal extensively with the 
role of government(s) within the economy. In order to further explore these concepts, I shall 
also provide a range of indicators, or variables, which will enable to fully compare and 
contrast the two cases. These variables will include income to property price ratio, annual 
growth in property prices versus inflation, and the role of the financial sector in both 
countries, all of which were chosen due to their relevance to housing bubbles. Other, variables 
are also used such as demographics and recent economic history, with their choosing, as of 
that of the more economic variables above, being motivated by their ability to identify 
similarities and differences between Japan and Ireland. Thus I shall carry out my analysis by 
recounting both the events of both cases and comparing and contrasting through use of my 
variables, with particular focus paid on the role of the state in both Japan and Ireland. 
Through such an approach, I believe that I will gain a deep understanding of the issue, and be 
able satisfactorily answer my research question.    
 
Throughout the course of this chapter I have sought to lay out the theoretical framework, or 
structure upon which this study was built. I explained the theory used, both of neoclassical 
economics and economic bubbles, with further explanation of their applicability to my study. 
Additionally, after also discussing some of the criticisms of neoclassical economics, I feel that 
I have presented a more balanced appraisal of my chosen theory which demonstrates a sound 
understanding of the issue. Having ‘armed myself with enough theoretical knowledge’ to 
progress, the following chapter deals with my methodolgical approach and how I gathered 
and analysed my data.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction to Methodology Section 
The methodological approach taken for this thesis was qualitative, as I regarded it as the most 
appropriate approach for the question my thesis sought to answer. Qualitative research, 
defined as “dealing with phenomena that are difficult or impossible to quantify 
mathematically such as beliefs, meanings, attributes and symbols”, may sacrifice in-depth 
knowledge of each single individual case, but can achieve an understanding of broad patterns 
across such individual cases which I believe is the key goal of my project.36 Rather than 
producing a black-and-white, almost mathematical result which is quantifiable the anticipated 
results of this thesis are to be more subjective and thus more responsive to any individual 
nuances that may arise from the data collected on each country. This is not to dismiss 
quantitative research, but rather to suggest I feel it is not best-fitted for my thesis. 
 
3.2 Terminology  
Before I begin the discussion regarding my methodology, there is firstly, an issue to be 
resolved regarding that of terminology. The widespread popularity of the term ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
to describe the strong economic growth of Ireland in this time period means that its usage in 
this thesis is almost without question. Unfortunately there is no similar term to describe the 
economic bubble of Japan during the late 1980s and early 1990s and so I believe it is most 
expedient to simply refer to this case as the ‘Japanese bubble’. Another admittedly minor 
issue of terminology is the use of the term Ireland as the name for the country of the Celtic 
Tiger. Throughout this thesis, the terms ‘Ireland’, ‘Republic of Ireland’ and ‘Irish State’ are 
used when referring to the 26 counties of the Republic of Ireland.  Article 4 of the Irish 
Constitution states: “The name of the State is Éire, or, in the English language, Ireland.”  Irish 
Statute law (The Republic of Ireland Act, 1948) states that “the description of the State shall 
be the Republic of Ireland”.  In the United Kingdom, the Ireland Act 1949 provided that 
"Republic of Ireland" may be used as a name for the Irish State.  However it did not make use 
of the term mandatory.   Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (major development in the 
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Northern Ireland peace process), the United Kingdom has accepted the name ‘Ireland’ for the 
Irish State and uses that name in international agreements with the Dublin government.37 It is 
this term which will be used to refer to the Irish case. 
 
3.3 Qualitative Research 
What approach to adopt was the first major decision I faced regarding methodology.. As I 
mentioned before, qualitative research is a research method which is chiefly concerned with 
an understanding of human behaviour, and what factors govern such behaviour.38 Focused 
more upon understanding phenomena and understanding social issues, rather than producing 
clear quantifiable results, qualitative research is often categorised as giving broad, sometimes 
subjective, answers from its studies.39 Due to this focus, qualitative research often employs 
smaller sample sizes than is the case in large quantiative studies; the small sizes being 
compensated for by a greater focus upon each case surveyed.40 Given the fact that my thesis 
only employs a sample of two individual cases, Japan and Ireland, and is not so focused upon 
statistical data, the attraction of such research is readily apparent. In contrast, quantitative 
research is frequently regarded as being more concerned with producing findings arrived at by 
means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification.41 As the research question of 
my thesis is somewhat subjective and not easily expressed through numerical data, I feel that 
a qualitative approach is the most suitable fit for me. Naturally, given the nature of the topic 
of this thesis I shall pay some attention to numerical variables derived from quantitative data  
However, I believe that such a crossover is natural, nay inevitable for “qualitative research 
will always involve quantitative elements and vice versa”.42 
 
3.4 Collective Case Study 
Another key issue to address was as to what particular form this thesis, and after much 
deliberation I decided to carry out a case study. A case study, as described by Punch, is a 
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study in which one case, or perhaps a small number of cases, is studied in detail with a 
general objective of trying to develop as full an understanding of the issue as possible.43 Case 
studies can also be subdivided into three different categories, being: intrinsic; instrumental 
and; collective.44 For the purposes of this thesis I decided to employ a collective case study. 
Defined by Stake as being a study in which “a number of cases are examined to investigate a 
general phenomenon”, such an approach directly tackles the issue of generalisation, which 
will be addressed below, by demonstrating the differences and similarities between two 
cases.45 I feel that such an approach fits well with the research aim of my thesis, as through 
studying they two cases of Japan and Ireland in depth, my overriding research aim is to gain 
an understanding of the general phenomenon of their economic bubbles. 
 
3.5 Issue of Generalisation 
One of the major problems facing researchers when conducting any form of study is that of 
generalisation, to infer an overall conclusion regarding an issue despite only viewing certain 
facts, examples or statistics. When examining an issue, it is virtually impossible to examine 
every facet of that issue, rather certain aspects, seen as relevant and providing a balanced 
view, are chosen with the aim of providing the researcher with a satisfactory conclusion. It is 
the prerogative of the researcher therefore, to select aspects, or cases, to study which present a 
full and balanced view of the issue being studied and prevent over-generalisation, a process 
referred to as ‘sampling’.46 Similarly to case studies, there exist different varieties of 
sampling, however for the purposes of this thesis I chose purposive sampling.47 A purposive 
sample is one which is selected due to the purpose of the study, with all subjects being 
selected due to some characteristic.48 As my two cases of Japan and Ireland are so central to 
my research aim, I believe this sampling refers more to my choice of variables to compare the 
two countries. These variables will be further outlined in this chapter so I will avoid 
discussing them in depth here, however they were all chosen as I believe as they are both 
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indicative of economic performance and can be witnessed in both countries, thus facilitating a 
comparison. It is these two aspects that is their common characteristic. 
 
3.6 Deviant Sampling 
The final note I shall add regarding case studies and sampling, is that of deviant sampling. 
Deviant cases are cases that do not fit into regular patterns of attitude or behaviour within an 
issue and their study can often provide researchers with a better understanding of more 
regular patterns and the issue as a whole.49 I believe in my case, this refers to variables in 
which Ireland and Japan differ. Again these will be discussed further in this chapter, however 
in my chapter regarding the Japanese case I explore a number of variables in which the two 
countries differ. By doing so I believe that I gain a deeper understanding of my research issue 
as a whole, and additionally avoid claims of selecting cases merely to suit my conclusions.50 
 
3.7 Motivation for Subject 
As I briefly mentioned in the introduction for this thesis, perhaps the key factor for my 
interest in, and decision to write my thesis about, this topic was due to its seemingly 
increasing relevance. When I began university in the Republic of Ireland in September of 
2008, the Irish Celtic Tiger era was to drawing to a close with the Irish states guarantee to six 
major banks later that month signalling its definite end. Around this time period it was 
common to read or hear from various media sources how the death of the Irish Celtic Tiger 
was similar to that of the Japanese economic bubble fifteen years previously, not only during 
the growth period but also in the subsequent bursting of the Japanese property bubble which 
Ireland looked likely to match.51 I found such comparisons fascinating, yet also noticed how 
they often were somewhat anecdotal, with few ‘hard studies’ done to justify such 
comparisons. Thus when the time came to select my thesis topic, I was reminded of these 
comparisons, wondering if such comparisons were indeed justified. This also led me to the 
research aim of my thesis: if the two cases were indeed so similar, then surely the Irish state 
might have taken lessons from the Japanese example some fifteen years previously?  This 
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then was to be the chief motivation for undertaking this study and the question that percolates 
each page of this work. 
 
Therefore, when it came to writing my thesis, in theory my task was straightforward - simply 
compare the Irish Celtic Tiger to the Japanese property bubble, note similarities and 
differences and conclude whether the Japanese case did indeed provide lessons for the Irish 
example. However, in practice such a comparison proved not quite so simple given the 
obvious differences between the two cases, these including: disparity in size between the two 
countries, both geographical and economic; demographic differences; differences in the 
history of economic development in each country and finally the differing time periods of 
both examples. Therefore, I had to find a way to enable to satisfactorily compare what, on the 
face of it, are two strikingly different countries.  
 
3.8 Form and Layout of Thesis 
This was achieved in a number of overlapping rather than discrete stages.  Firstly, I 
established a list of more general variables between Japan and Ireland  to assist me in my 
comparisons and contrasts and also to provide some form of background to the reader 
regarding both countries. Following this, I then drew up a list of more economic variables to 
compare the two countries, in order to provide crucial background data regarding each 
country’s bubble. Variables to compare Japan and Ireland were: past economic history; 
political history; size of country and range of population and historic role of the state within 
the economy.  The economic variables employed were: growth in property prices versus 
national inflation; affordability of property and the role of the financial sector within both 
nations. Naturally attention was also paid to the ways in which the two cases differed lest I 
inadvertantly mighte ignore differences’.  Contrasting factors included disparity in the sizes of 
both countries and their economies, structure of both economies and demographics. Finally, 
the role of both governments in their respective bubbles is also given attention as this is 
perhaps the key focal point of the thesis, and again provides more background to the reader. 
 
I chose the above variables as I believed that they would best assist me in accurately 
addressing my research aim. As my research aim does not easily identify with a given 
academic field, for example political science or economics, it was somewhat challenging to 
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carry out such a study. However, I feel that this enabled me to ‘borrow the best of practices’ 
from a number of academic fields as my thesis was not strictly tied down to one distinct area, 
and also taught me a great deal about various disciplines as I sought to establish which was 
the best fit for my particular study. When it came to gathering my variables, obviously the 
general variables were quite easy to find as I could use readily available histories of the two 
countries or simply draw from personal knowledge backed up by data derived from reputable 
sources such as the Central Statistics Office of Ireland. When it came to finding the economic 
variables, I was lucky as the Irish Central Statistics Office makes available numerous statistics 
relevant to the Irish economy, as do major Irish  banks such as Allied Irish Bank and Bank of 
Ireland.  
 
This is not so true for the Japanese case and initially provided me with some trouble; however 
I was able to overcome by utilising sources such as the International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank and through emailing a real estate agency named Japan Property Central, who were kind 
enough to reply to my query with information regarding historic property affordability in 
Japan. Such difficulty in procuring statistics regarding the Japanese case was somewhat 
surprising, and with the benefit of hindsight (always 20-20 vision) I would allow myself more 
time to gather this type of data in a future research study   Nevertheless, the data obtained on 
each country did allow me make interesting comparisions between them both 
 
3.9 Time Period Discussed in Thesis 
An important decision in the writing of this thesis was also to clearly define the time period of 
both cases that would be used in this dissertation. For the Japanese case I chose to take the 
signing of the Plaza Accord in 1985 as my starting point with the year 1991 being my ending 
point. I chose these as the Plaza Accord is recognised as leading to a significantly 
strengthening the Yen during the 1980s, itself a contributing factor to the Japanese property 
bubble, and generally is regarded as when property prices began to exceed their fundamental 
value.52  1991 is a convenient ending point as this is the year where interest rates were 
significantly raised and property prices first began to fall.53 In the Irish example, I chose the 
year 1995 as a starting point as it was the year after the term ‘Celtic Tiger’ was coined, by 
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Morgan Stanley economist Kevin Gardiner, and it was also during this time that  the 
impressive growth of the Irish economy began to attract global attention.54 As the Irish case is 
still somewhat unresolved, I chose to take the signing of a bailout treaty with the IMF in 
November 2010 as a convenient ending point. Given the focus of this thesis is to ascertain 
what action could or perhaps should have been taken by the Irish government; I feel it is 
appropriate to use this event as a closing point.  Additionally it also marked the passing of 
complete economic autonomy out of the state’s hands, as the combination, or ‘troika’, of the 
IMF, European Commission and European Central Bank who funded the recused package for 
Ireland, began to direct economic policy for the nation.55 In both cases there shall 
occasionally be mention of events which take placed beyond the aforementioned timelines, 
for instance the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.  However, these are occasional and brief and 
only take place where I deem it necessary and relevant. 
 
With the aims of aims and research question of this thesis now clearly identified  as well as 
the manner in which I sought to carry the study out I move now to discuss the Irish property 
situation from 1995 until 2010 and the Japanese economic bubble from 1985 to 1991, 
beginning in the following chapter with the Japanese case.   
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Chapter Four: Japanese Economic Bubble, 1985-1993 
 
4.1 Recent Economic History of Japan 
The tale of Japan’s extraordinary economic in the decades following the Second War is well-
known and requires little further elaboration here. Through a combination of factors such as 
aid and assistance from the United States, strong bureaucratic and education systems and 
government direction from ministries such as the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), Japan managed to regain pre-war production levels by the mid-1950s.56 Indeed during 
the period 1953 to 1965, annual GDP growth averaged over nine per cent with Japan rated as 
the world’s second largest economy, according to GNP, by 1968.57 This period of high growth 
is usually recognized as being ended with the coming of the First Oil Crisis of 1973, which 
coupled with the US termination of the convertibility of the dollar to gold two years previous, 
seemed to challenge the Japanese method of export-led growth. However through efforts by 
the state and bureaucratic institution such as the MITI, Japan avoided the stagnation that beset 
other nations, with GDP growth averaging three and a half per cent for the remainder of the 
decade.58 Indeed Japan also began to shift its economy, while the export sector continued to 
underpin the economic stability of the nation, domestic consumption began to play a greater 
role-though reservations began to be aired concerning the degree to which certain less 
efficient industries such as textiles and steel were subsidized. 
 
A new period of economic growth, and the focus for this thesis, was ushered in with the Plaza 
Accord of 1985, broadly speaking an agreement amongst the then G5 countries who decided 
the US dollar was overvalued. Essentially the goal of the accord was that countries running 
surpluses, namely Japan and West Germany, would seek to boost domestic demand and allow 
their currencies to appreciate.59 Accordingly the Plaza Accord triggered a large appreciation 
in the value of the yen, amounting to thirty per cent by the end of 1986-with the Deutsch 
Mark rising similarly. As a result of the new stronger currency both Japanese exports and 
GDP growth dramatically slowed in the first half of 1986, with the six months being termed 
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the ‘Endaka Recession’.60 Under considerable public pressure to reverse this trend, authorities 
responded with a large macroeconomic stimulus package coupled with reduction in the 
interest rate by three percentage points. Resultantly by the following year the economy 
recovered with stock and urban property prices tripling by the end of the decade when 
compared to pre-Plaza levels. 
 
This rise in property prices, especially in the Tokyo region, had begun to cause national 
concern-even as early as the post-Endaka recession recovery period.61 Two investigation 
committees were summoned that year, with both summarising that the rise in land prices was 
significantly higher than should be expected and would need to be significantly slowed were a 
major property bubble to be avoided. This rise in prices of Tokyo property began to both 
show itself in property prices in other major urban areas and to be mirrored in the value of the 
Nikkei Index.62 The national government decided that it needed to act and by reducing the 
continuing rise in property prices, an economic bubble would be avoided. Tax reforms were 
introduced, most notably in 1987 and 1988, designed to reduce the attractiveness of property 
ownership, however despite these introductions, land prices, and additionally those of stock 
indexes, continued to rise unabated with apparently no end in sight.63 
 
This, seemingly never-ending, trend of rising prices was finally curtailed however by the 
rising of interest rates. Rates which stood at 2.5 per cent in 1987, a level which had been 
constant for the decade, rose first to 4.5 per cent in December 1989 and then 6 per cent in 
August the following year.64 This tightening of interest rates had a dramatic effect, curbing 
lending within the property sector, leading to falls of first stock values and later those of 
property. Given the extent to which the wider Japanese economy’s fares were intertwined 
with those of property and the stock index, their declines unsurprisingly transmitted to the rest 
of the economy. Private fixed investment annually fell by over two per cent on average for the 
rest of the decade and growth GDP averaged 0.5 per cent, a dramatic fall from a growth rate 
of 4 per cent for the previous decade.65 These and other indicators led to Japan’s economic 
performance during the 1990s being termed ‘The Lost Decade’. The actual events of the rest 
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of the 1990s in Japan are not significantly relevant to the objective of this thesis and will only 
be paid cursory attention, with most attention being directed towards the role of the Japanese 
government both during and directly after the bubble and to what extent this can be compared 
with Ireland. 
 
4.2 Comparison with Ireland 
The following portion of this chapter will to be to establish the grounds upon which Japan and 
Ireland, focusing not only on economic factors but also cultural and historical. An 
investigation of the state of certain economic variables as listed previously in the 
methodology section will be made later in this chapter, however firstly I shall more generally 
compare and contrast Ireland with Japan so as to provide the reader with a contextual 
background. Establishing these commonalities will assist the writing of this thesis by 
justifying the comparison between Ireland and Japan, and explaining why these two countries 
were chosen. Firstly however, in order to avoid claims of a ‘circumstantial comparison’, I will 
first give mention to significant contrasts between the two. 
 
The major difference that springs to mind is that of the disparity in size between Ireland and 
Japan, both physically and in terms of population. Japan’s territory of 378,000km! dwarfs the 
70,000km! of Ireland, while the population disparity is greater: Japan’s population stands at 
127 million while Ireland’s is merely 4.5 million.6667 Perhaps even more pertinently, the 
demographic structure of these populations is differs significantly, Ireland has a population 
that has an average age of 35.1 years, is growing at 1.112 per cent68 and of whom thirteen per 
cent were born outside the island of Ireland. In marked contrast the Japanese population is 
averagely aged 45.4 years, is declining at a rate of .077 per cent and is ninety-eight per cent 
ethnically Japanese.6970 
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There are also significant economic differences between the two countries, namely that of 
savings rates. During the 1980s Japan was well known for having one of the highest savings 
rates in the world, while Celtic Tiger Ireland was similarly known for having one of the 
lowest.71 The economic history of the two is also quite different: the Japanese bubble came on 
the back of, save for the destruction wrought by the Second World War, over a century of 
continued growth following the Meiji Restoration; in contrast the Celtic Tiger was arguably 
the first instance of real economic growth Ireland had experienced since prior to the Act of 
Union in 1801. 
 
Despite these differences, I believe that there are also a number of significant similarities 
between the two countries to allow us to make this comparative study. Given the physical 
disparity between the two countries, the Japanese economy naturally dwarfs that of Ireland; 
however on a per captia basis there exist a strong number of comparable factors.  Both 
countries enjoy living standards among the highest on the United Nations’ Human 
Development Index; Ireland’s 7th placing of 0.916 being slightly higher than the Japanese 10th 
place of 0.912, GDP per captia is broadly similar standing at $39,638 for Ireland and $36,179 
for Japan.72 73 When this comparison is made between the two periods of question for this 
thesis, the similarity between Ireland and Japan is also significant:  adjusted for inflation the 
GDP per captia ratings for both countries at their respective peaks-1990 for Japan and 2007 
for Ireland-are $50,200 for Japan and $48,300 for Ireland.74 75This scenario can be seen in 
performance of both countries in the HDI at their respective peaks: in 1990 Japan had the 
highest rating with 0.996 while Ireland in 2007 had a rating of 0.959 which earned it 5th place. 
7677The average GDP growth rate for both countries during their bubble periods is also 
similar, between 1985 and 1990 the Japanese economy averaged growth of 4.53 per cent 
which is similar to that of Ireland between 1997 and 2007, which averaged 4.8 per cent.7879 
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Beyond the economic comparisons, there also exist a number of cultural, historical and 
geographical factors that are, perhaps surprisingly, similar in both cases. Both countries are 
obviously island nations on the extremities of Eurasia with four major provinces, one of 
which-Ulster in the Irish case and Honshu in Japan’s-is considered for various cultural and 
political as somewhat distinct from the other three. Both Ireland and Japan are dwarfed by a 
much larger neighbour, with a ten-to-one population ratio, who at various times has 
attempted, or succeeded, to extend control over its smaller neighbour, and who still retains 
both economic and cultural significance. This parallel can also be strengthened by considering 
the presence of nearby smaller nations who have more similarity to our two cases than their 
large neighbours, Korea in the Japanese case and Wales and Scotland in the Irish.80 While 
their sizes differ dramatically, both Ireland and Japan possess diasporas whom are recognised 
as being distinct from ‘other foreigners’ and treated accordingly, another example of cultural 
similarities shared by the two nations. 
 
A perhaps more relevant comparison is that of the political culture of the two nations, both 
employing a two-house parliamentary system led by a somewhat symbolic figurehead who 
lacks real power, the Emperor of Japan and President of Ireland. However it is the existence 
of a ‘party of power’ in both countries which I believe is the strongest similarity. While 
neither the LDP or Fianna Faíl are currently in power, both have enjoyed significant spells in 
government since the end of the Second World War and share a similar electorate as their 
main support. This similarity I feel is one of the strongest when comparing Ireland and Japan, 
especially when considering the objective of this thesis as both ‘parties of power’ played a 
significant role in the bubbles of their respective nations. 
 
While it may seem like the above points comparing Ireland and Japan are somewhat 
circumstantial and a similar comparison could be made between any two random countries in 
the world, I believe that there do exist significant comparable aspects between the two 
nations-as Brillet’s explanation of why the term ‘Celtic Tiger’ was chosen to symbolise the 
Irish example illustrates.81 In any case I believe the above more general comparative aspects 
have provided background and will now examine a series of more economically pertinent 
variables as discussed in the earlier chapter. These variables shall provide more of an 
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objective background and allow us to properly ascertain how similar the bubbles of both of 
our cases are. 
 
4.3 Economic Variables 
The first variable to examine is that of House Price Index in comparison with general national 
inflation. The significance of this variable is easy to understand as it simply measures the rise 
in property price versus overall price rises in the economy. This thus allows the reader to 
establish whether property price rises are irrational and unsustainable and thus forming a 
‘bubble’, or whether they are simply in line with a general increase in the cost of living in a 
country. The House Price Index versus Inflation for Japan in the period 1984 to 1998 can be 
seen below in Figure 3.1, clearly demonstrating how property prices exceeded the rate by 
which they might be expected to increase if adhering to general inflation. 
 
Figure 4.18283 
 
 
Such a disparity between the two rates should not be surprising given that the property 
market, as shall be expanded further on in this chapter, were one of the key markets available 
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for investment by banks, thus Japan can be clearly seen as having had a property bubble-
further demonstrated by the abrupt drop in prices following the zenith of 1991. The effect of 
such raising property prices is well-known; home-owners feel more confident about their 
financial prospects which is reflected in consumer spending, a ‘last to get on the train’ 
mentality pervades which thus sustains an expanding bubble of rising house prices which 
eventually bursts once house prices exceed too far beyond their ‘natural’ amount.84 In cases 
such as Japan where house prices dramatically exceed inflation, property is seen as an even 
surer bet for returns on investments which in turn exacerbates the severity of the bubble and 
makes its eventual bursting all the more damaging. 
 
The second variable to examine is that of house price to income ratio. Generally expressed as 
the ratio of median house prices versus median income in either percentage or as years of 
income, it is regarded as a basic affordability measure for housing in a given area.85 Its appeal 
lies in its inherent simplicity, as it is easily apparent how expensive property is to purchase for 
a population. Thus we can quite easily establish whether a nations housing market is 
experiencing an economic bubble. The exact ideal value of a price to income ratio is difficult 
to establish as it can differ greatly between various countries, however a ratio of seven is often 
regarded as the upper threshold for a ratio in a market in which property is still somewhat 
affordable for the general population, while a ratio above ten indicates a market experiencing 
a severe bubble. The graph on the following page, Figure 3.2, illustrates the historic price to 
income ratio for Tokyo in the period 1989 to 2006.  
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Figure 4.286 
 
 
Upon quick observation of this graph it is easy to note how the Japanese property market was 
in a bubble period, reaching its zenith in 1991 before subsequently falling. The ratio of 11.52 
for Tokyo as a whole, with certain areas having a value as high as over fifteen,  represents a 
strongly inflated property bubble with subsequent falls being as low as under five further 
illustrating this. In the following chapter I shall compare this ratio with that of Ireland, 
seeking to establish how similar the severity of property bubble was in both countries. 
 
The final variable to compare between the Irish and Japanese cases is that of the role played 
by the banking sector in both countries. As has been outlined previously in this chapter a 
major factor in the inflation of the Japanese bubble was the strength of the nation’s financial 
institutions, itself partly due to the strength of the Yen and traditional high savings rate. Such 
health and easily obtainable credit fuelled growth in both stocks and the real estate market, 
and facilitated a lax loaning policy. Despite the decline in value of the Nikkei stock index 
following the climb-down in property prices as the Japanese bubble burst at the beginning of 
the 1990s, the Japanese financial sector still outwardly appeared in rudimentary health, as 
banks were kept afloat so as to maintain consumer confidence.87 Throughout this decade loans 
with a low guarantee of being repaid were still made, as so-called ‘zombie banks’, loss-
making banks which were kept artificially alive, became increasingly common. These factors 
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were finally brought to a close with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; Japanese banks had 
been among the key financiers in the South East Asia, providing over forty per cent of loans 
within the region.88 In contrast to the period following the bursting of the asset price bubble at 
the beginning of the decade, the Japanese state proved unwilling to assist banks in poor 
condition, allowing recognised institutions such as Sanyo Securities and the Hokkaido 
Takushoku bank to fall.89 The fallout from the 1997 Financial Crisis forced the close of 
numerous zombie banks, pushed the economy back into recession after two years of tentative 
growth and in many respects marked the nadir of the Japanese bubble.90The role of financial 
institutions during the Japanese bubble intensified the expansion period of the bubble, and 
hindered swift recovery during the subsequent bursting phase, both of which were somewhat 
due to overly-lax lending policy, behaviour which will be seen in the following chapter when 
discussing the Irish case. 
 
After having gone through the explanatory variables of the Japanese case, I will now pay 
some attention to analysing the role of the Japanese state, both during and after the bubble. 
Such analysis is especially relevant given the goal of thesis is to somewhat compare 
government roles. Before beginning such an analysis however, it is necessary to provide some 
context of the role of the Japanese state in its economy by briefly discussing its historical 
involvement in the economy.  
 
4.4 Role of State in Economy 
Traditionally the Japanese state’s economic policy has been far from laissez faire, with state 
involvement in the economy dating from the as early as the Meiji era-where government 
activities often exceeded 40 per cent of total investment.91 This continued following the 
Second World War, with in particular the Ministry for Trade and Industry (MITI) being 
heavily involved in shaping industrial policy. Such state direction was often regarded as being 
a distinctive feature of the Japanese economy, and instrumental in its success-helping Japan 
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weather storms such as the First and Second Oil Crises relatively better than other OECD 
countries.92  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Plaza Accord of 1985 marked a new period in Japan’s 
economic history as a sharply rising Yen threatened to end the traditional export-led growth 
model, similarly it also marked a new period of state involvement in the economy.93 As 
exports were seemingly threatened by the strong Yen and with confidence spooked by the 
Endaka recession, Japan sought to offset such potential declines and fuel future growth by 
increasing domestic consumption-interest rates were lowered and financial liberalisation was 
undergone so as to encourage the flow of money through the system.94 Such liberalisation 
made it easier to borrow from abroad, placing pressure on the traditional Japanese system of 
relational banking. Faced with declining returns from traditional areas, banks responded with 
aggressive lending in order to find new borrowers and heavy focus onto one of the few fields 
left open to investment-the property market.95 
 
The growth in property prices had been a concern to the national government since the 
beginning of the 1980s given the degree to 96which it outpaced general growth in GDP, as has 
been demonstrated earlier in this chapter. One of the more significant measures taken was a 
decentralisation policy expressed by the government in 1982, a policy which by seeking to 
spread property growth between various urban areas sought to constrain excessive inflation in 
property prices.97 However this policy was seemingly contradicted by the desire to expand 
Tokyo as a major international financial centre, a desire explicitly expressed in late 1980s.98 
Such promotion of Tokyo coupled with the relative paucity of investment options available to 
Japanese banks resulted in the continual rise of property prices-especially in major urban 
areas. By the end of the decade this rise had led to such concern amongst policymakers that 
the state decided to tighten monetary policy in order to curb such land price inflation, raising 
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interest rates in May 1989 from 2.5 per cent to 3.25 per cent thereby beginning an fifteen 
month course of action that would see rates standing at 6 per cent in August 1990.99 
 
At such time there was certainly recognition of the fact that the Japanese economy had 
excesses needing correctly but few expected that the coming decade would be dominated by 
sluggish economic performance and a deepening financial crisis. In December 1989 the 
Nikkei Index stood at 39,957.44, marking the zenith of the Japanese economic bubble, 
seemingly it seemed little could go wrong with the Japanese economy.100 However the 
tightening of interest rates had more of an effect that merely curbing lending in the property 
sector, rather it resulted in dramatic deflation of both stock and land prices and a deterioration 
of the balance sheets of the large financial institutions and corporations which had dominated 
the economy since the end of the war. In response to this downturn interest rates were lowered 
from 5.5 per cent in July 1991 to 3.25 twelve months later, and subsequently would be 
reduced to as low as 0.5 per cent in September 1995.101 However despite such a reduction in 
interest rates the economy continued to languish, suggesting that the authorities seemed to 
have underestimated the depth of the problems facing the economy.  
 
A key criticism of the Japanese government in this period is its slow reaction to the crisis 
facing the nation’s banks, allowing financial instability and fragility to fester until a full-scale 
crisis in the financial sector was to emerge in 1997. In contrast Garside points to the example 
of the Swedish banking crisis during a similar time period where the Swedish government 
sought swift corrective action, nationalising failed banks and seeking to minimise loan losses 
to a two year period from 1991 to 1993 whereas in the Japanese case, loan losses consistently 
exceeded operating profits until the end of the 1990s.102 These loan losses were in some part 
explained by the existence of so-called ‘zombie loans’-banks loaning to troubled businesses 
with whom they had links and showed little prospect of improvement or repayment. Such 
loans to the distressed property and constructed sectors in fact exceeded loans to all other 
sectors in the decade following the bursting of the Japanese bubble.103 Finally the economic 
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situation in Japan was exacerbated by the continual rise of the Yen, which hampered exports 
and assisted in pushing the economy further into stagnation. 
 
4.5 Role of LDP in Bubble 
An aspect of the state’s involvement during the bubble period, and one which is reflected in 
the Irish example as we shall see in the following chapter is the fear that the governing Liberal 
Democrat Party (LDP) had of upsetting their electoral support. Traditionally the party’s 
support has come from rural conservative voters, which might also have been a factor for the 
desire during the 1980s to limit centralisation, and the fear of potentially causing voters to 
lose their employment may explain the lack of a crackdown on the zombie loans discussed 
above. Both the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Bank of Japan (BOJ) appear to have been 
aware that a large number of institutions were either undercapitalised or at risk of insolvency 
but privately avoided action and publically downplayed the severity of the problems.104 Such 
failure to adequately curb the ‘sham performances’ of many financial institutions came to a 
head in 1997 when the range of bad loans possessed by many Japanese banks were exposed 
by the Asian Financial Crisis of that year. Established companies such as Sanyo Securities 
and the Hokkaido Takushoku bank were bankrupted, causing unprecedented economic 
disruption.105 Against this backdrop as numerous commercial banks were being cut off from 
access to credit the government launched in February 1998 what was to become a series of 
injections of public funds into the economy.106 However despite such action the response was 
neither sufficient nor properly targeted and the fundamental problems in the financial sector 
remained leading the so-called ‘Lost Decade’ to become ‘Decades’ as growth during the 
2000s failed to meet that of previous decades before the bubble.107 
 
Through the course of this chapter I provided background to previous historical Japanese 
economic performance, analysed important variables relating to the bubble and recounted the 
role of the state during both the bubble and its subsequent crash. Therefor I believe that the 
first actor of this comparison has been adequately dealt with. In the following chapter I shall 
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discuss the Celtic Tiger in Ireland, examine the same variables dealt with in this chapter in the 
Irish case and similarly examine the role of the Irish government during its nations bubble 
period before attempting to draw conclusions in the closing comparative chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Celtic Tiger of Ireland, 1995-2010 
 
5.1 Recent Economic History of Ireland 
After having analysed the economic bubble experienced by Japan in the previous chapter, 
attention is now to be turned towards that of the Irish case. A major contrast between the Irish 
Celtic Tiger and Japanese Bubble is the respective economic history experienced by countries 
prior to their bubbles. While Japan’s bubble followed decades of strong growth, the Celtic 
Tiger was the first sustained period of real economic progress in Ireland since the signing of 
the Act of Union in 1801.108 Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, 
Ireland had been one of the worst performing economies in Europe, being described in the 
1980s as “the sick man of Europe”.109 The Irish economy in the 1980s was mired in 
stagnation exacerbated by a poor economic climate in Great Britain to which the Irish 
economy was still largely dependent upon. However the seeds for future growth were sown 
by a bi-partisan agreement, known as the ‘Tallaght Strategy’, enabling both parties to 
introduce policies relating to economic and welfare reform, investment in education, lowering 
of taxes and reduction in borrowing.110 
 
Such reforming policies, coupled with a devaluation of the punt in 1993 and the beginning of 
a series of social partnership agreements designed to limit excessive growth in wages, began a 
turnaround in the Irish economy, leading economist Kevin Gardiner in 1994 to compare 
Ireland with the well-known ‘Asian Tigers’ and dub the country’s impressive growth the 
‘Celtic Tiger’.111 External factors such as funds from the European Union and increased 
investments from the US allied with Ireland’s well-educated, English speaking and 
comparatively cheap labour force, resulted in average annual growth of over seven per cent 
until the turn of the millennium. By the end of the turn of the millennium Ireland’s staggering 
economic performances stood in marked contrast to the relative insipid growth and 
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unemployment rates of the rest of the EU and was described by the Economist in 2001 as “an 
economic miracle”.112 
 
The Celtic Tiger’s momentum was temporarily slowed in 2002 due to a decline in the global 
economy, and more principally the IT industry in which Ireland was a major player. Ireland 
was also affected by a reduction in its economic competitiveness due to factors such as rising 
wages, rising insurance premiums and a strong Euro all of which hit exports to traditional 
Irish markets such as the US and Great Britain and saw outsourcing of traditional industrial 
jobs to lower-cost markets.113  However this downturn was a slowdown rather than a 
recession with signs of a recovery apparent in late 2003 as investment levels from the US 
increased again. However rather than being based on a competitive labour force and increases 
in productivity, this second Celtic Tiger was largely dependent on a deregulation of the 
financial sector and a burgeoning housing market. Traditionally a net emigration nation, 
Ireland now found itself the recipient of migrations as the European Union expanded from 
fifteen to twenty-five states in 2004, benefitting from an influx of new inexpensive, well-
educated migrants which to some extent compensated for Ireland’s loss in competitiveness.114 
Ireland again was receiving plaudits and drawing envious glances for its flourishing economy, 
with Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond declaring ambitions for his country to mirror 
Ireland’s success and become a “Celtic Lion”.115 However the continuation of the Irish boom 
was not without criticism, with sceptics arguing that the economy was overly dependent upon 
the construction industry which employed over 12 per cent of all employed in the state, had 
allowed its exports sector to stagnate and its competitiveness had worsened.116 
 
By the end of 2007 sales within the property market had markedly slowed which cast doubts 
on the durability of the Irish economy. In the budget of that year both the economy and 
government finances began to demonstrate signs of an impending recession, tax revenues fell 
five per cent short of predictions which resulted in "2.3 billion surplus of the previous year 
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being struck from government books.117 Following the turn of the year, such signs began to 
accelerate as unemployment increased from 4 per cent to 6.2 per cent in June of 2008. That 
month the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) forecast that the Irish economy 
would, for the first time since 1983, slightly contract that year.118 
 
In September of that year Ireland became the first country in the Eurozone to officially enter 
recession, with a recession being confirmed by GDP following 0.8 per cent in 2008’s second 
quarter. Following this declaration, the Irish government announced that the national budget 
would be brought forward from its usual December date to October 14th to reflect the new 
economic situation.119 However probably the most significant development in this time period 
was a bank guarantee undertaken by the government on September 29th 2008. Described by 
the government as covering “all deposits (retail, commercial, institutional and interbank), 
bonds, senior debt and dated subordinated debt”, this blanket guarantee of six major banks 
was intended to maintain confidence in the banking system and prevent a run on savings 
deposits similar to that of Argentina at the turn of the millennium. However this guarantee 
ended up costing the state several times the original estimated amount as hidden 
nonperforming loans, previously unknown, began to emerge in the months following the 
guarantee.120 In particular Anglo-Irish Bank was found to have high levels of non-performing 
loans, which after emerging in December 2008 lead to the resignations of three executives. A 
month later with shares standing at 2 per cent of their 2007 value, Anglo-Irish was 
nationalised by the state due to recapitalisation being deemed too  insufficient.121 
 
In November 2010, after eighteen months of further deterioration in both the general economy 
and embattled financial sector, Prime Minister Brian Cowen declared that Ireland had 
formally requested financial support from the EU’s European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the following weeks Ireland became 
the first Eurozone member to receive a financial assistance package with a loan in the region 
of "100 billion agreed in the following weeks.122 
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5.2 Economic Variables 
Following the recounting of the Irish Celtic Tiger, it is now time to direct attention towards 
the variables concerning the property bubble, beginning as in the previous chapter with a 
comparison of House Price Index with general national inflation. The significance of this 
variable is easy to understand as it simply measures the rise in property price versus overall 
price rises in the economy. This thus allows the reader to establish whether property price 
rises are irrational and unsustainable and thus forming a ‘bubble’, or whether they are simply 
in line with a general increase in the cost of living in a country. The House Price Index versus 
Inflation for Ireland in the period 1996 to 2010 can be seen below in Figure 4.1, clearly 
demonstrating how property prices exceeded the rate by which they might be expected to 
increase if adhering to general inflation. While the exact patterns are not identical, the 
similarity in distance between annual rises of property value and inflation can be seen in both 
cases highlighting the depth of the bubbles of both respective countries. 
 
Figure 5.1123124 
 
 
This disparity between the two rates should not be surprising given that the property market, 
as was the case in Japan, was the main area of investment in by Irish banks, thus we can see 
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that similar to Japan, Ireland was clearly suffering from a property bubble-further 
demonstrated by the abrupt drop in prices following the nadir of 2010. The effect of such 
raising property prices is well-known and was dealt in the previous chapter; home-owners feel 
more confident about their financial prospects which is reflected in consumer spending, a ‘last 
to get on the train’ mentality pervades which thus sustains an expanding bubble of rising 
house prices which eventually bursts once house prices exceed too far beyond their ‘natural’ 
amount. In cases such as Japan and Ireland where house prices dramatically exceed inflation, 
property is seen as an even surer bet for returns on investments which in turn exacerbates the 
severity of the bubble and makes its eventual bursting all the more damaging. A second factor 
in the Irish case is also the cultural importance attached by the people to property ownership-
seen as being a by-product of the Great Famine and independence struggle against the United 
Kingdom-which has been regarded by commentators such as David McWilliams and George 
Lee as a contributing factor in the expansion of the Irish property market during the Celtic 
Tiger.125126 
 
As in the previous chapter, the next variable to examine is that of house price to income ratio. 
Having already previously been explained and discussed, I regard further expansion as being 
unbeneficial and so will merely present the Irish case. Similar to that of Japan, the price to 
income ratio of Ireland clearly indicates a severe property bubble, with peak and trough 
values similar to their Japanese equivalents. The growth in house prices versus earnings 
during the 1990s, the period prior to the intensification of the Celtic Tiger, in Ireland can be 
seen below in Figure 5.2, highlighting how a disparity began to be seen around the middle of 
the decade-the point when the Celtic Tiger is generally regarded as beginning. Furthermore 
the house price to income ratio as a whole for the period 1995 to 2010 can be seen in Figure 
5.3 below. 
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Figure5.2127 
 
 
Figure 5.3128129 
 
 
As mentioned above, the resemblance with the Japanese example is striking with values at 
peak and trough of bubble being similar in both cases. The ratio in the Japanese case at peak 
in 1991 of 11.52 is markedly similar to the ratio for Ireland of 10.41 in 2005, while again ratio 
values at trough are again similar with the resemblance between Japan’s ratio of 4.96 in 2005 
and the Irish ratio of 5 in 2010 easy to see. As in the examination of the first variable in this 
chapter, the similarity between the two cases is easy to observe, suggesting the severity of 
both bubbles was broadly similar. 
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As was the case in the previous chapter, attention shall now be turned towards the role played 
by financial institutions in Ireland. Similarly to Japan, a major fuel in the growth of the Celtic 
Tiger was the role played by the banking sector as purveyors of accessible credit, itself 
exacerbated by the low tax policy and financial deregulation which had begun to take place a 
decade before the expansion of a bubble-again strong similarities with the Japanese 
example.130 The accessibility of credit began to expand dramatically alongside growth in the 
property market from 2003 onwards, as the housing sector began to become the major factor 
fuelling growth in the Irish economy.131 Similarly to the Japanese financial sector at the 
beginning of the 1990s, at the zenith of the Celtic Tiger Irish financial institutions were 
among the strongest in Europe, with the size of the banking sector far larger than the actual 
Irish economy.132 As will be further expanded upon later in this chapter, the overextension of 
the Irish banking sector began to be exposed as the Irish property bubble unravelled during 
the summer of 2008, with matters coming to a head as the Irish state issued a blanket 
guarantee for six major banks in late September of that year in an effort to stabilise the wider 
economy and quell consumer fears. As in Japan the accessibility of easy credit assisted in 
fuelling the expansion of the Celtic Tigers property bubble, while loans made as a result of 
such easy credit weighed down banks and demanded action on the part of the state so as to 
prevent their failure. Indeed the only significant difference between the two cases is the speed 
with which the Irish banking sector unravelled, the state guarantee taking place months after 
cracks began to be exposed, whereas in the Japanese example it was some half a decade later 
following the Asian Financial Crisis that the banking sector began to suffer as losses caught 
up with banks that had engaged in ‘zombie loans’. 
 
5.3 Role of State in Economy 
After having analysed the variables of the Irish Celtic Tiger, and briefly compared them to 
those of the Japanese case, I will now direct attention towards the role of the Irish state within 
the economy, both historically and more recently. Historically since independence the role of 
the state in the Irish economy had been laisezz faire, in part determined by financial necessity. 
Following the destruction wrought by the War of Independence and Civil War, the overriding 
ambition of the new government was to rebuild national infrastructure and restore stability to 
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the nation’s balance sheet, taxes were raised from their previous levels during the United 
Kingdom and public spending was low with Minister for Finance Ernest Blythe articulating 
the government’s position when he stated “the state is not in the business of providing work 
for people”.133 However following the accession to power of Fianna Faíl in 1932, the 
economic stance of the state changed to protectionism a stance which Ireland would largely 
follow for the next six decades, policies which arguably led to Ireland’s poor economic 
position at the beginning of the 1980s.134 
 
The governments of the 1980s had few options but to attempt to alleviate the nation’s budget 
problems, therefore there was a raising of taxes and cutting of public services all of which 
managed to reduce the primary deficit in half by 1983.135 However due to high interest rates 
and slow growth, the debt burden of the country continued to rise-standing at 116 per cent of 
GDP by 1986.136 Additionally such policies were naturally unpopular with the electorate, 
leading to a series of unstable governments culminating in three different governments in 
sixteen months from June 1981 to November 1982.137 
 
A shift in policy was taken in 1987 with a bi-partisan agreement known as the Tallaght 
Strategy between the governing Fianna Faíl party and its opposition Fine Gael. As taxes were 
judged to have been raised to their maximum level and Ireland had few inflationary options 
due to its membership of the EMS, public spending was drastically cut even further. Due to 
the tacit support from the opposition and public assurances that such policies were taken for 
financial rather than ideological reasons, public outcry was relatively limited which allowed 
the state breathing room to continue with such liberalisation policies. Within three years the 
public deficit had been eliminated and the debt to GDP ratio was under 100 per cent. With the 
size of the state’s role in the economy reduced, the macro-economic environment stabilised 
and economic growth began, registering 4 per cent in 1989.138 An additional successful 
government policy was the introduction of social partnership agreements between the state 
and trade unions. Beginning in 1987 with ‘Programme for National Recovery’, these 
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agreements would help to increase the attractiveness of the Irish labour force by maintaining 
low wages and would continue for the following two decades. Additionally the signing of the 
Maastrict Treaty in 1992 also committed Ireland to follow sound fiscal policies, reassuring 
outside investment which again assisted in an increase in FDI.139 
 
As stated before Ireland’s growth began to accelerate during the 1990s, catching international 
attention and leading to the coining of the term ‘Celtic Tiger’. Much of such growth has been 
attributed to government policies during this time period, the high tax policies of the previous 
decade reversed as personal tax was reduced to 22 and 46 per cent standard and top rate 
respectively by the end of the decade. Corporation tax was also lowered from 40 to 10 per 
cent in the same period in order to attract further FDI, with further duty-free zones such as the 
IFSC in Dublin or Shannon in the west of the country.140 After being labelled “the sick man of 
Europe” in the 1980s, Ireland had now closed and then surpassed the living standard 
differential with the rest of Western Europe, with a significant portion of such growth 
attributable to the policies undertaken by the state. Ireland’s liberalisation policies can be seen 
by the fact that a country which formerly was dominated by protectionist Keynesian policies 
was now ranked in the top ten ‘freest economies’ at the end of the decade by the Fraser 
Institute. 141 
 
As has been outlined before, the first Celtic Tiger is usually regarded as ending with the 
downturn of the global economy following the September 11th attacks of 2001, often 
attributed to a drop in FDI levels-especially from US companies- a significant factor in this 
relative drop-off was a loss in labour competitiveness which had been a major factor in the 
attractiveness of Ireland during the previous decade.142 However by late 2003 FDI returned to 
former levels and Irish economic growth began to accelerate once again with growth levels in 
2004 being the highest in the EU at 4.5 per cent. Media sources were quick to take notice of 
this resurgence, dubbing it the ‘Celtic Tiger Mark Two’.  
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However this continuation of the Irish boom was treated with somewhat scepticism, with 
some domestic critics such as David McWilliams asserting that such growth was due to over-
promotion by the state of the construction sector, which was beginning to create a property 
bubble.143 Concerns had been raised about the sustainability of the Irish property market for a 
number of years, however similar to the Japanese case such growth was almost inevitable as 
the property market was viewed as the most lucrative areas for banks to invest into. The role 
of the financial sector in the Celtic Tiger was also often questioned due to its apparent lack of 
enforced regulations, with the New York Times describing Ireland as the “Wild West of 
European finance” in 2005, a perception helping to prompt the creation of the Irish Financial 
Services Regulatory Authority.144 However despite its mandate for stricter oversight, the 
agency never imposed major sanctions on any Irish institution, with accusations that it was 
more focused on processes rather than outcomes and too much trust afforded to major banks 
and financial service providers.145 
 
By the summer of 2007 a downturn in the Irish property market was apparent as sales fell 
significantly from the previous twelve months; however speculation of a sharp fall in prices 
were dismissed with numerous commentators declaring that Ireland would merely suffer a 
‘soft landing’.146 Despite their significant exposure to the performance of the property market, 
it is argued that major Irish banks such as AIB and Bank of Ireland would have been able 
avoid significant losses were the global economy to remain benevolent. However as is well 
known and requires little further expansion here, by 2007 fears over a burgeoning sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the United States had transformed into a growing credit crunch, the depth 
of which was both revealed and accelerated by the collapse of Lehmann Brother’s in the 
autumn of 2008. 
 
By late summer of 2008 after increasing fears over a downturn in the Irish economy for much 
of the year, the banking sector in Ireland was regarded as being in crisis and danger of a literal 
collapse. Following the filing for bankruptcy by Lehmann Brother’s on September 15th, these 
fears were exacerbated with the Irish financial sector regarded as being in danger of 
immediate collapse.  Thus in response to these fears on September 30th the Irish government 
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issued a guarantee that the state would stand behind the assets and liabilities of the six major 
banks. Cumulatively valued at "400 billion, over twice the GDP size of the Irish economy, the 
guarantee immediately garnered market relief however also drew criticism due to the apparent 
speed taken to make the decision.147 Such criticisms were put more in perspective with 
economist David McWilliams stating that Finance Minister Brian Lenihan had visited him the 
night before seeking advice with apparent little knowledge or confidence of what action the 
state ought to take in the burgeoning Irish credit crisis.148 While generally regarded as being 
necessary in order to calm markets, the Irish bank guarantee has received much criticism for 
its lack of prior research as the liabilities of many banks proved to be much larger than 
previously estimated, in particular those of Anglo-Irish Bank which needed to be effectively 
nationalised in January 2009. While the approach of the Japanese state towards its embattled 
banking sector during the 1990s was criticised for being somewhat too ponderous, the Irish 
bank guarantee has often been accused of being too hasty, with too little proper investigation 
of deliberation. 
 
As outlined earlier in this chapter, such guaranteeing of the Irish banking sector failed to curb 
economic stagnation, with the signing of a financial assistance package with the so-called 
‘troika’ of the International Monetary Fund, European Central Bank and European 
Commission in November 2010 signalling a definitive end to the Celtic Tiger period. 149 
 
5.4 Role of Fianna Faíl in Bubble 
With similarities to the role of the LDP in the Japanese economic bubble, I believe the role of 
Fianna Faíl is also an important factor in the creating and bursting of the Irish property 
bubble. Similar to the LDP in its conservative and occasionally populist ideology, Fianna Faíl 
has traditionally regarded itself as the ‘party of power’ in the country. As stated above a major 
factor of the Celtic Tiger was the attraction of FDI by the political stability afforded to the 
country by the secure position of Fianna Faíl in government. The association of the party with 
the strong economic growth of the country has been recognised, with a number of 
commentators arguing that subsequent government policies to encourage the continuing 
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growth of the property sector were designed to maintain electorate support. Measures such as 
SSIAs, a savings scheme launched in 2002 by the government- conveniently designed to 
reach maturity months before the 2007 General Election-with respondents specifically 
encouraged to spend dividends on property.150 A common criticism of the party during the 
Celtic Tiger was that it assumed its position in government to be natural, and saw maintaining 
the heady growth rates of the ‘First Celtic Tiger’ as the being the most expedient way to hold 
onto such power. Its attitude of the party to the property bubble in the country can be 
illustrated by the assertion of Taoiseach Bertie Ahern in 2007 that he was unable to 
understand how those who questioned the sustainability of property growth “didn’t just 
commit suicide”.151 The relative lack of criticism of Ahern also illustrates the degree with to 
which the performance of the economy, at which stage was still positive, was associated with 
the governing party. 
 
Throughout the course of this chapter I have attempted to recount the major events concerning 
the Irish Celtic Tiger property bubble, both its formation and subsequent bursting. 
Additionally through this recounting I have also referenced back to the previous chapter 
concerning Japan. Through this I believe that I have provided a satisfactory comparison 
between the respective bubbles of Japan and Ireland, and can now proceed to the final 
conclusive chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter concludes this Master’s study and draws the threads running through the thesis 
together.  The purpose of this study was to establish the extent to which similarities could be 
made between the economic property bubble of the Irish Celtic Tiger and the Japanese 
economic property bubble of fifteen years previously.  Furthermore, alongside these 
comparisons, the study questions whether experiences from the Japanese case might have 
provided lessons to the Irish state. Through the course of this thesis I have established 
sufficient similarities between the two cases to facilitate valid comparisons to be made. 
Comparison was made between the two bubbles through a variety of variables focusing both 
on property bubbles and political economy in general, with particular attention being paid to 
the role of both states in their respective bubbles.  
 
To recap for the reader: the overarching research question that drove the research of this study 
was as follows: 
Might the Japanese economic bubble of 1985 to 1993 have provided lessons to the Irish 
state which would have mitigated the ramifications following the collapse of the Celtic 
Tiger of 1995 to 2008? 
 
After having analysed the two cases I contend that the answer to this question is Yes, the Irish 
state could, and should have analysed the effects of the Japanese economic property bubble of 
1985 to 1993 and applied them to its own case. Similar state actions, or indeed non-action in 
both countries exacerbated the affects the respective property bubbles had in both Japan and 
Ireland.  This in turn led to ‘over-cooking’ of the two economies and subsequent economic 
stagnation in both countries. Policies which contributed to this ‘over-cooking’ include: 
excessive financial deregulation; allowing the capital region to expand at a rate far greater 
than the rest of the country-whilst paying ‘lip service’ to decentralisation; allowance of the 
property sector to hold disproportionate importance to the economy as a whole and; the state 
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turning a blind eye to malpractices within the banking sector. A point of note is that governing 
parties in both Japan and Ireland appeared to be almost assuming their entitlement to office 
and thus made irresponsible decisions so as to appease electoral support. 
 
The nigh-on two decade long economic stagnation experienced by Japan following the 
bursting of its property bubble in the early 1990s illustrates how difficult Ireland will surely 
find the path to recovery following the end of the Celtic Tiger. While significant efforts have 
been made to reform the Irish economy in recent years, especially the financial sector, such as 
the Financial Stability and Reform Bill of 2013, it is often the case that such reforms are both 
easier and more effective to implement prior to a financial crisis, rather than following one.  
Accordingly this study makes the following recommendations, made with the benefit of an 
analysis of the Japanese case: 
  
Firstly that the Irish state should have avoided excessive deregulation of the financial sector, 
and in particular monitor the lending behaviour of banks within it. 
Secondly, when the Irish state was required to inject public funds to support the banking 
sector, it should have endeavoured to conduct thorough investigation and research before 
doing so. 
Thirdly that the Irish state should have avoided the property sector becoming a major driver of 
economic growth. 
The final recommendation made is that rather than seeking to continue economic growth 
based on past economic policies (some of which have now been discredited) a state should 
consider that such growth may have been as a resulting of ‘catching up’ and thus is not 
sustainable going forward.  Lower, more sustainable growth rates could prove more beneficial 
to the fiscal health of a nation in the long term. 
 
No thesis is without its limitations and so before concluding remarks, possible limitations of 
this study are addressed at this point.  As a lone researcher I was inevitably restricted in terms 
of the expected length of the final thesis, and the resources I was able to draw from.  The ease 
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with which I obtained data from Ireland contrasted sharply with the difficulties I encountered 
souring information about Japan.  This was not only restricted to a language barrier (although 
this did inhibit access to some data).  As an Irish person I was, of course, extremely familiar 
with the negative effects of the economic property bubble in that country.  I was less familiar 
with Japan. As such I consulted four respected economic academic commentators asking for 
recommendations to sources of Japanese economic data.  Somewhat surprisingly, these 
commentators were unable to point me in the direction of additional data, beyond what I had 
already managed to source. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the comparisons observed as a 
result of this study point to the validity of a future, more longitudinal study being conducted 
between Ireland and Japan.  Both countries provide valuable lessons to other economies 
whose property bubbles are stealthily growing. 
 
While the recommendations made by this study lie on the path of common sense, there are 
nevertheless I believe applicable to current economic climates, in Ireland but also beyond the 
boundaries of just the Republic of Ireland.  If these recommendations had been enacted by the 
Irish authorities, I contend that they would have mitigated the growth of the Irish property 
bubble and therefore have averted the turmoil caused by its bursting in 2008.  Ireland is still 
trying to recover from the widespread ripple effects caused by the violent bursting of its 
property bubble.  Other countries, that perhaps in the past regarded Ireland’s sprinting Celtic 
Tiger of the early years of this century with something approaching awe have now the 
opportunity to check themselves and re-evaluate the experiences of both Japan and Ireland 
with a view to avoid a similar fate, post property bubble bursting. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
&%"
"
Bibliography: 
 
Aoki, ‘Decentralisation and Intergovernmental Finance in Japan’, available at 
http://www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/discussion_paper/ron187.pdf (accessed 2 May 2013) 
Amrine, ‘Origins and Characteristics of Recent Residential Real Estate Bubbles’, 
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol.7, No.1, Article.7 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis, ‘What is Neoclassical Economics?’, Panoeconomicus , Vol 53, 
Issue 1, pp.5-18, 2006 
Aspromourgos, ‘On the origins of the term neoclassical’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
Vol.10, No.3, pp.265-70, 1986 
Banque de France, ‘Financial Stability Review October 2008, available at http://www.banque-
france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financ
iere/rsf_1008.pdf (accessed 29 April 2013) 
BBC, ‘Irish bank set to be nationalised’, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7832203.stm (accessed 12 May 2013) 
BBC, ‘Salmond gives Celtic Lion vision’, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/7042726.stm (accessed 12 April 2013) 
Brennan and Moehler, ‘Neoclassical Economics’, available at 
http://www.moehler.org/files/Neoclassical%20Economics.pdf (accessed 24 April 2013) 
Brillet, ‘Ireland and Japan-the search for the tiger’, Irish Geography, Vol.38, No.2, pp.225-32, 
2005 
Brunnheimer and Oehmke, ‘Bubbles, Financial Crises and Systematic Risk’, NBER Working 
Paper No.18398, September 2012  
Carpenter, ‘Why Japan Can’t Reform’, 2008 
Central Statistics Office, ‘Industrial Wages’, available at 
http://www.cso.ie/quicktables/GetQuickTables.aspx?FileName=QIJA.asp&TableName=Indus
trial+Earnings&StatisticalProduct=DB_QI (accessed 16 April 2013) 
&&"
"
CIA, ‘World Factbook: Ireland’, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ei.html (accessed 7 April 2013) 
CIA, ‘World Factbook: Japan’, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ja.html (accessed 7 April 2013) 
Clark, ‘Political Economy: a comparative approach’, 1998 
Cresswell, ‘Qualitatative Inquiry and Research Design’, 2007 
Denny, ‘What did abolishing university fees in Ireland do?’, available at 
http://www.ucd.ie/geary/static/publications/workingpapers/gearywp201026.pdf (accessed 1 
May 2013) 
Department of Finance, ‘Special Savings Incentive Accounts – 2004 analysis complied by 
Revenue Commissioners’, available at http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=3072 
(accessed 21 April 2013) 
D’Orlando, ‘Will the Classical-type Approach Survive Straffian Theory?’, Journal of Post-
Keynesian Economics, Vol. 27, No.4, pp.633-54, 2005 
The Economist, ‘Ireland Shines’, available at http://www.economist.com/node/149333 
(accessed 13 May 2013) 
ESRI, ‘Quarterly Economic Commentary June 2008’, available at 
http://www.esri.ie/news_events/latest_press_releases/quarterly_economic_commen_9/ 
(accessed 7 May 2013) 
Fraser Institute, ‘Economic Freedom of the World: 2005 Annual Report’, available at 
http://www.freetheworld.com/release_2005.html (accessed 14 April 2013) 
Garside, ‘Japan’s Great Stagnation’, 2012 
Goldstein, ‘Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures and Systematic Implications’, 1998 
The Guardian, ‘Celtic Tiger licks its wounds as Ireland’s boom crumbles’, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/03/ireland-economy-financial-recession 
(accessed 11 May 2013) 
&'"
"
The Guardian, ‘Ireland bailout: full government statement’, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ireland-business-blog-with-lisa-
ocarroll/2010/nov/28/ireland-bailout-full-government-statement (accessed 1 May 2013) 
The Guardian, ‘Ireland vs. the world: time for geo-political hardball’, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/ireland-business-blog-with-lisa-
ocarroll/2010/nov/16/ireland-bailout-crisis (accessed 2 May 2013) 
Hamada, ‘Japan 1968: a reflection point during the economic miracle’, available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp764.pdf (accessed 3 May 2013) 
Hobbs, ‘Young People as Active Citizens: Placing Youth Participation Structures in the 
Republic of Ireland under Critical Scrutiny’, Holliday, ‘Doing and Writing Qualitative 
Research’, 2012, available at http://eprints.nuim.ie/3914/ (accessed 26 April 2013) 
IFSC, ‘Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority’, available at 
http://www.ifsc.ie/company.aspx?idcompany=127 (accessed 13 April 2013) 
IMF, ‘Spillovers to Ireland’, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp0802.pdf (accessed 17 April 2013) 
IMF, ‘World Economic Outlook April 2011’, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/ (accessed 10 April 2013) 
Inflation.eu, ‘Historic Inflation Ireland’, available at http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-
rates/ireland/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-ireland.aspx (accessed 19 April 2013) 
Inflation.eu, ‘Historic Inflation Japan’, available at http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-
rates/japan/historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-japan.aspx (accessed 24 April 2013)’ 
Irish Department of Finance, ‘Budget 2007’, available at 
http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2007/Documents/BudgetTables.pdf  (2 May 2013) 
Irish Independent, ‘Central Bank predicts soft landing for housing’, available at 
http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/central-bank-predicts-soft-landing-for-housing-
26296858.html (accessed 17 April 2013) 
&<"
"
Irish Independent, ‘New Tallaght Strategy needed to solve crisis’, available at 
http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/new-tallaght-strategy-needed-to-solve-crisis-
26503241.html (accessed 15 April 2013) 
Irish State, ‘Immigration Act 2004’, available at 
http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Immigration_Act_2004.pdf/Files/Immigration_Act_2004.pdf 
(accessed 17 April 2013) 
Irish Times, ‘Government Statement on Budget’, available at 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/government-statement-on-budget-2009-1.828177?via=rel 
(accessed 19 April 2013) 
Irish Times, ‘Time to finally tackle our blatant failings’, available at 
http://elaine.ie/2009/02/24/time-finally-to-tackle-our-blatant-failings/ (accessed 12 April 
2013) 
Jarrow, Protter and Shimbo, ‘Asset Price Bubbles in Complete Models’, available at 
http://www.math.mcmaster.ca/~grasselli/JarrowProtterShimbo07.pdf (accessed 26 April 
2013) 
Jansen, ‘The Making of Modern Japan’, 2009 
Johnson, ‘Value (political economy)’, The New International Encyclopaedia’, Volume XIX 
Joubish, ‘Paradigms and Characteristics of Good Qualitative Research’, World Applied 
Sciences Journal, Vol.12, Issue 11, pp. 2082-7, 2011 
Keogh, ‘Twentieth Century Ireland’, 2005 
Komáromi, ‘Anatomy of Stock Bubbles’, available at 
http://www.stockmarketbubbles.com/anatomy.pdf (accessed 1 May 2013) 
Lyons, ‘Taking stock of Ireland’s property market’, available at 
http://www.daft.ie/report/ronan-lyons-2012q2 (accessed 4 April 2013) 
Mera and Renaud, ‘Asia’s Financial Crisis and the Role of Real Estate’, 2001 
Murphy, ‘The ‘Celtic Tiger’-an analysis of Ireland’s economic growth performances’, 
available at http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/00_16.pdf (accessed 26 April 2013) 
&="
"
McWilliams, ‘A warning from deserted ghost estates’, available at 
http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/2006/10/01/a-warning-from-deserted-ghost-estates (accessed 
17 April 2013) 
McWilliams, ‘Follow the Money, 2010 
McWilliams, ’Japan’s housing slump was scary, and ours could be too’, available at 
http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/2008/07/02/japans-housing-slump-was-scary-and-ours-could-
be-too (accessed 26 April 2013) 
McWilliams, ‘The Generation Game’, 2007 
McWilliams, ‘The Pope’s Children’, 2004 
McWilliams, ‘The Pope’s Children: Watch Online’, available at 
http://www.davidmcwilliams.ie/the-popes-children-watch-online (accessed 16 April 2013) 
Obstfeld, ‘Time of Troubles: the yen and Japan’s economy, 1985-2008’, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14816.pdf?new_window=1 (accessed 27 April 2013) 
Powell, ‘Economic Freedom and Growth: the case of the Celtic Tiger’, available at 
http://mercatus.org/publication/economic-freedom-and-growth-case-celtic-tiger (accessed 14 
April 2013) 
Punch, ‘Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches’, 2005 
Reserve Bank of Australia, ‘Bulletin December Quarter 2012’, available at 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2012/dec/pdf/bu-1212.pdf (accessed 6 May 2013) 
Rihoux, ‘Configurational Comparative Methods’, 2009 
RTÈ, ‘Ahern apologises for suicide remark’, available at 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0704/90808-economy/ (accessed 23 April 2013) 
RTÈ, ‘Banking guarantee bolsters Irish market’, available at 
http://www.rte.ie/news/2008/0930/108605-economy/ (accessed 23 April 2013) 
RTÈ, ‘Reeling in the Years: 2006’, available at 
http://www.rte.ie/tv/reelingintheyears/2006.html (accessed 14 April 2013) 
Silverman, ‘Doing Qualitative Research’, 2010 
&F"
"
Shimizu and Watanabe, ‘Housing Bubbles in Japan and the Us’, Public Policy Review, Vol.6, 
No.3, March 2010, pp.431-72, 2010 
Shirai, ‘Promoting Tokyo as a major international finance centre’, available at 
http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication_pdfs/Shirai_tokyo_financial_center112007.pdf 
(accessed 1 May 2013) 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams, ‘Bubbles, Crashes and Endogenous Expectations in 
Experimental Spot Asset Markets’, Econometrica, Vol.56, No.5, pp.1119-151, 1998 
Stake, ‘Handbook of Qualitative Research: Case Studies’, 2005 
Tachibanaki, ‘Public Policies and the Japanese Economy’, 1996 
Takafusa, ‘Lectures on Modern Japanese Economic History 1926-1994’, 1994 
Telegraph, ’Alex Salmond speech branded balderdash’, available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/1578650/Alex-Salmond-speech-branded-
balderdash.html (accessed 2 May 2013) 
Trading Economies, ‘List of Countries by GDP Per Captia’, available at 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-per-capita-ppp (accessed 15 April 2013) 
UN, ‘Human Development Report 1990’, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1990/ (accessed 4 May 2013) 
UN, ‘Human Development Report 2007/8’, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/ (accessed 5 May 2013) 
UN, ‘Human Development Report 2013’, available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/humandevelopmentreportpresskits/2013report/ (accessed 
19 April 2013) 
Veblen, ‘Why is Economics not an evolutionary science?’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 12, No.4, pp.373-97, 1898 
Walter, ‘From developmental to regulatory state: Japan’s new financial regulatory system’, 
Pacific Review, Vol.19, No.4, pp.405-28, 2006 
'G"
"
Weintraub, ‘Neoclassical Economics’, available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html (accessed 14 April 2013) 
World Bank, ‘GDP Growth (annual), available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (accessed 17 April 2013) 
World Bank, ‘GDP Per Captia’, available at 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 28 April 2013) 
Whelan, ‘Ireland’s Sovereign Debt Crisis’, available at 
http://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/WP11_09.pdf (accessed 5 April 2013) 
Yoshikawa, ‘Japan’s Lost Decade’, 2002 
